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WOMEN ATTORNEYS AND THE JUDICIARY
By JAMES

F.

GILSINAN,*

LYNN OBERNYER,** AND

CHRISTINE A. GILSINAN***
INTRODUCTION

And during all those busy hours,
Filled with estates, wills, companies' powers
In closing deals-court work-now
A genuine lawyer thou.1

The purpose of this article is to explore the role of the female
attorney vis-A-vis the judicial role. While it is clear that women
involved in the practice of law have their days filled with much
of the same kind of work as their male colleagues, including the
items mentioned in the quotation above, the sociological concept
of role includes more than the fulfilling of certain defined functions. Sociologically, a role is both a set of patterned behaviors
and a set of expectations on the part of others about the appropriate activity the role should encompass.' Thus, the concept of role
has to be viewed in a framework that takes into account both the
reiterated, structured behavior of the person playing out his or
her part in the social situation and the expectations of the others
in that situation about how the part should be played and the
success these others assign to an individual in meeting such expectations.
Unfortunately, however, the expectation component of role
oftentimes contains more than simply what the role should encompass or how the role should be played. It may also include an
expectation of who should play the role. If this expectation is not
met at the outset, the role incumbent may then experience difficulty in being recognized as an adequate player even if the basic
occupational or behavioral elements are in fact fulfilled and fulfilled well. Therefore, sociologically, it is not enough that women
* Assistant Professor of Sociology, Regis College, Denver, Colorado; Criminal Justice
Consultant, Denver Police Department; Ph.D., 1972, University of Colorado.
** B.A., 1966, Chatham College; M.A., 1969, Carnegie Mellon University; J.D., 1975,
University of Denver College of Law.
*** B.A., 1969, Loyola University; Candidate for Juris Doctor Degree from the University of Denver College of Law, 1975.
Wigle, Sisters in Law, 5 CAN. B. REv. 419 (1927).
M.L. DEFLEUR, W.V. D'ANTONIO, & L.B. DEFLEUR, SOCIOLOGY: MAN IN SOCIETY 41-

2 (1971).
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graduate from law school, pass the bar, and actually engage in the
practice of law. A key question must also be the recognition that
is given women attorneys as equal members of the bar. The answer to this question will in turn hinge on the expectations that
others hold concerning the role of attorney including expectations
about who should play the role.
Such a question is of more than academic interest since a
lack of professional recognition can also mean a lack of professional success. If law school deans, professors, colleagues in practice, judges, and even clerks all hold the expectation that lawyering is essentially a man's occupation, the female practitioner can
expect to have a much more difficult time than her male counterpart in achieving eminence and the income that attends it. The
lack of professional recognition also has consequences beyond the
immediate plight of the individual woman attorney. The recognition given or withheld from women attorneys by functionaries in
the legal system can affect the decisions of judges, the decisions
of juries, in short the fate of clients and the principles upon which
our legal system is based. If a person's chances of obtaining justice are excessively influenced by the sex of that individual's
counsel, the whole system of justice is seriously called into question.
This paper will concentrate primarily on the interactions of
women attorneys with judges during the course of trial. Judges
are, however, merely a part of the legal system and occupy only
one role that has influence on the course of justice. Therefore,
where appropriate, the treatment accorded women by other functionaries of the system will be described and commented upon.
I. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A review of the literature dealing with judicial views of
women generally and female attorneys specifically indicates a
need to explore this issue. The literature suggests that such views
are in a state of flux, with the earlier literature indicating a definite judicial bias against women, and the modern literature indicating a movement away from more blatant forms of sexism.
Historically, the judiciary has not shown itself to be a champion
of women's rights. In an article by Doris L. Sassower, the rather
dismal record of the courts in this area is reviewed.' The case of
I

Sassower, Women and the Judiciary: Undoing "The Law of the Creator",57 J. AM.
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Bradwell v. Illinois4 in 1873-where the Supreme Court sustained
the denial of Bradwell's application to practice law in Illinoisset the tone for many of the future judicial views regarding the
place of women. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Bradley
dismissed the contention that the fourteenth amendment conferred upon women the right to pursue any legitimate employment, including the practice of law. He said:
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator. 5

This case is of special significance since it portended a rather
rough going for women in general and female attorneys in particular as they pursued goals through the bar of justice.' Sassower
goes on to describe a number of early judicial decisions through
1948 in which courts continued to base decisions on the "Law of
the Creator," particularly in the area of restricting employment
opportunities .'
Admittedly, presently the status of women in all aspects of
American society is in a state of flux. However, while certain
decisions may provide encouragement for those seeking legal
equality for women, certain other cases leave room for doubt. As
late as 1961 in Hoyt v. Florida,"the Court continued to view the
place of women as belonging primarily in the home by upholding
statutes limiting women's participation on juries. This decision
was called into question only this summer? The Court has only
found two classification schemes based upon sex to be a violation
Soc'y 282 (1974).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
Id. at 141 (concurring opinion).
A year after Bradwell, the Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162 (1874), denied women the right to vote under the fourteenth amendment. A
constitutional amendment was thus needed in order to obtain for women the franchise.
' In Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), for example, a case heard by the Supreme
Court in 1908, state statutes were upheld that restricted the number of hours a woman
could work, how much she could lift, the payment of minimum wages, and so forth. Forty
years later the Court was still attempting to restrict women in terms of employment as
the case of Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), shows. There the Court said that
women could be denied licenses to be bartenders. Sassower, supra note 3, at 283.
8 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975). The Court distinguished Hoyt by stating
that it had not involved the question of a defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury
decision from a fair cross section of the community nor the prospect of a denial of that
right by the systematic exclusion of women as a class.
JUD.
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of equal protection: statutes giving preferences to males for appointment as estate administrators' and regulations forcing only
women armed services members to prove dependency of their
spouse to collect housing allowances and medical benefits."
These cases appeared to suggest a "same situation, same treatment" test. However, other cases have allowed different treatment: property tax deductions only for widows,' 2 longer time
before a nonpromoted Navy female officer can be mandatorily
discharged, 3 denial of unemployment compensation benefits for
pregnancy leave,' 4 and denial of the right of a married woman to
have a driver's license issued in her maiden name.'" As a result
of the way the Court has dealt with the cases, there is disagreement among the courts and the commentators as to whether sex
is a suspect category and thus entitled to the stricter new equal
protection standards.'"
The implication of some of these decisions is clear. Certain
judges tend to place women in traditional roles. That is, they hold
the expectation that women will or should stay in the home, or
at least in those occupations suited to the unique talents they
possess because they are women. This type of stereotypical response to women contains two elements, both of which constitute
what has been termed the conservative or traditional view of
women. 7 First, there is the notion that certain occupational roles
are "woman" roles, and, second, the notion that women inherently possess certain job related skills because of gender. The
tendency for some members of the judiciary to take this traditional view of woman's role is perhaps best illustrated in this
quote from Chief Justice Burger during the oral argument before
the Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation:'"
"

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 671 (1973).
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975).
" Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
" Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classificationand the Definition of Sex
Discrimination,75 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1975); Annot., 27 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1971); Annot.,
17 A.L.R. Fed. 768 (1973).
'" A. COLLINS, THE ATrrUDES TOWARD WOMEN SCALE: VALIDITY, RELIABILITY AND SUBRI
"

SCORE DIFFERENTIATION

(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the University of Maryland

Library) (Aug. 3, 1973).

Is 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (oral arguments), cited in L.
SOCIETY, CASES AND MATERIALS

54 (1973).

KANOWITZ, SEX ROLES INLAW AND
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Burger: Well I have to assume up to this time, Mr. Senterfitt, that
the reason you have 75 or 80 percent women is that again something
that I would take judicial notice of, from many years of contact with
industry, that women are manually much more adept than men and
they do this kind of work better than men do it, and that's why you
hire women ...

After some discussion of this point, the Chief Justice went on to
state:
Burger: The Department of Justice, I am sure, doesn't have any
male secretaries. This is an indication of it. They hire women secretaries because they are better and you hire women assembly people

because they are better and you make the distinction between
women who have small children and women who don't; so it appears
on the record."

A question arises as to the effect on female attorneys of the
holding of such views by members of the judiciary. Do judges who
have a traditional outlook concerning the role of women negatively sanction female counsel, since at the outset she does not
meet the judge's expectation about the appropriate role for
women? At this point, the answer to the question is at best hypothetical. However, it is evident that some female practitioners
feel judges do discriminate against them because of gender. Thus
judges are seen as exhibiting a conservative male bias toward
women not only in the decisions they render, but also in the job
related interactions they have with women lawyers. This was the
concern of women attending the Fifth Annual National Conference on Women and the Law held in Austin, Texas in 1974. Those
women attorneys involved in the litigation of Title VII actions
"charged that judges, who must award 'prevailing' fees to an
1 Id. The case arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court held
the company could not refuse to hire women with preschool children if it continued to hire
men with children that age. However, the Court remanded with the suggestion that this
hiring policy could be salvaged if the company could prove conflicting family obligations
could be demonstrated to be more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a
man.
More recently, Time Magazine has reported an exchange in a state court in much the
same vein as the above remarks.
"You're getting a divorce?"
"No, my client is."
"You're the secretary?"
"No, I'm the lawyer."
"You're the lawyer?"
TIME, May 26, 1975, at 40.
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attorney winning a Title VII case, consistently award lower fees
to women attorneys."
Some women attorneys feel, therefore, that their sex is definitely taken into account by judges and that their gender does
affect the process of judicial decision making. This perception on
the part of some women practitioners that their sex is an issue in
the fulfilling of their occupational role also extends to the profession at large. An article in the New York Times reporting on
another national conference on the place of women in law held at
Stanford in March 1975 summarized this view, by saying that
professors still make jokes about women, male judges still treat
women-even women judges-differently than they treat men, and
women still feel less than welcome, if welcome at all, in the legal
profession."

The most thorough study done of women attorneys is White's
classic study, Women in the Law2 which was published in 1967.
More recent articles on women attorneys generally refer to the
White study and give updated figures on law school enrollments
and percentages of attorneys in the United States who are
women.? Even though it is dated, White's results are still valid
as indicating trends in the profession. The study indicated that
women law graduates are discriminated against in terms of the
types of jobs available to them, and the financial remuneration
they receive from the practice of law. Concerning income, White
found that during the first year of practice there was an average
differential of $1,500 in the income of male attorneys as opposed
to female attorneys, and that the differential between the two
groups increased each year until the difference was some $8,300.24
The women in White's sample also showed a heavy concentration
25
in federal, state, or local government work as compared to men.
This fact, together with White's finding that 57 out of 63 placement directors questioned reported that discrimination against
female law graduates in hiring is significant or extensive, suggests
that women have been restricted regarding the types of jobs avail2 Stein, Women and Law Conferences '74, TiAL, July/August 1974, at 32.
21 N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1975, at 28, col. 1.
2 White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1051 (1967).
3 TIME, May 26, 1975, at 40-41.
2 White, supra note 22, at 1057.
2 Id. at 1075.
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able to them."6 This interpretation is strengthened by noting the
findings of other researchers in this area. Dorothy W. Nelson,
quoting an item in the October 1970 issue of the American Bar
News, states that 9 out of 10 large law firms refuse to interview
women lawyers." Discrimination in hiring is also noted by Janette Barnes in the Journal of Legal Education.21 Finally, White's
study indicates that well over half of his female respondents
(N = 1148) felt that they had been discriminated against in seeking employment within the legal profession. His sample of female
attorneys reported 1,963 separate occasions of potential employthat there was a polers' actually stating to a female respondent
2
icy against the hiring of female attorneys.
The view of the legal profession toward women participants
can also be ascertained by noting the place of women in law
school. A review of this data leaves some room for encouragement,
although the historical perspective is rather negative. In 1967, 4.3
percent of the people entering law school were women; in 1970,
7.8 percent; in 1972, 16 percent;30 and, in 1974, 20 percent of the
incoming students were women. 3 1 While this indicates a lessening
bias on the part of law school admissions committees, it is unclear
as to whether this lessening bias came about because of changed
views or because of legislation against both racial and sexual
discrimination.
In 1972, women constituted 38 percent of the work force, but
they were only 3.5 percent of all lawyers, a proportion that had
undergone little change since 1910. In 1910 they were 1.0 percent
of the legal profession, but the progress to 3.5 percent in 1972 had
not kept pace with women's increased attendance at college and
in the general work force. 32 Data from 1974, however, clearly
shows that in the last 2 years more change has taken place in this
regard than during the preceding 62 years. The American Bar
" Id. at 1085.

" Address by Dorothy W. Nelson, University of Oklahoma College of Law Enrichment Program, Apr. 6, 1973, in 26 OKLA. L. REV. 375 (1973).
" Barnes, Women and Entrance to the Legal Profession, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 276 (1970).
White, supra note 22, at 1085-86.
" Bysiewicz, 1972 AALS Questionnaireon Women in Legal Education, 25 J. LEGAL
ED. 503 (1973).
TnME, May 26, 1975, at 41.
2 Id.; Jacobs, Women in Law School: Structural Constraintand Personal Choice in
the Formation of ProfessionalIdentity, 24 J. LEGAL ED. 462, 465-66 (1972).
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Association's most recent report indicates that women now comprise between 5 and 7 percent of the nation's 400,000 practicing
33
attorneys.
Clearly, then, certain strides have been made by women in
the profession of law. Not only have their numbers increased in
both admissions to law schools and in participation at the bar,
but the traditionally male structures of the legal profession are
undergoing slow but sure modification. Many schools have added
special courses on women's legal rights and a few even use a
desexified casebook written by two Harvard professors.3 4 Yet, on
the whole, female law students are still faced with structures that
reinforce the traditional view of women held by some members
of the legal profession. An example from a typical property textbook illustrates the stereotyped character women students are
sometimes ficed with: "for, after all, land, like woman, was
meant to be possessed. .. .
In reviewing the literature on women and the law, then, certain points stand out. Historically, the judicial view of women has
tended to place them in traditional roles. Although this is changing somewhat, there are still indications that a number of judges
are reluctant to abandon this perspective. Whether or not this
expectation affects judicial views of women attorneys is at this
juncture an open question, 6 although again there are clear indications in the literature that some female practitioners perceive
that this is in fact the case. 7
Given the above discussion, it is rather surprising to find that
little research has been done regarding the specific role interactions of female attorneys and judicial functionaries. This lack of
specific research is a surprise for a number of reasons. First, the
available literature seems to indicate that there may be some
33 TIMe, May 26, 1975, at 41.

u Id.

u C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE, cited in Ginsburg, Treatment of Women by
the Law: Awakening Consciousness in the Law Schools, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 480 (1971).
u In summarizing what seems to be the historical attitude of judges toward women
colleagues, an observation from the autobiography of Florence E. Allen appears apt. In
1934 she was appointed to the federal bench and she states that her fellow judges so
disapproved of her appointment that they would not even look at her during the working
sessions of the court, let alone talk to her cordially. Sassower, supra note 3, citing F.
ALLEN, To Do JusTLY (1965).
" See text accompanying notes 20 & 21 supra.
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cause for concern that the sex of the attorney does influence judicial action. Second, it is apparent that this issue is perceived by
some female practitioners as an important one and one that needs
investigation. Third, the situation is apparently fluid and in some
state of change. Since this seems to be the case, the topic should
be of current interest to both researchers and the public at large.
Yet no specific studies of judicial actions or attitudes toward
female attorneys were uncovered. Because of the lack of such
specific research, then, this study is of the nature of an exploratory effort. That is, it merely hopes to indicate some areas for
future investigation, and at the same time offer some tentative
data on the nature of judicial interaction with female attorneys.
Such an exploration can accomplish two things. It can pinpoint
some of the problems women might encounter as they go about
the practice of law. More importantly, perhaps, it can also lead
the way to a further understanding of the judicial role in the
context of how justice is administered. It is this understanding
that can help insure the equal treatment of all groups before the
bar of justice.
II.

METHODOLOGY

The question this research addresses is whether judges, by
their words and actions during courtroom proceedings, recognize
and attribute to women full professional standing as members of
the bar; i.e., are the expectations they portray regarding the role
of attorney the same regardless of the sex of the role incumbent.
In attempting to answer this question, this study utilizes as its
primary methodology participant observation. This approach is
particularly apt since the field being explored is relatively unstudied. Although numerous studies have been done on the process
of judicial decision making, including the relevance of background factors, political party affiliation, and so forth, 8 no data
exists on the judicial view of women in the court and how or
whether such views affect judges in conducting trials where
clients are represented by women lawyers.
Since this is, therefore, a new area of exploration, a questionnaire approach is at this stage an inappropriate tool to use in
I See, e.g., Nagel, JudicialBackground and CriminalCases, 53 J. CamM. L. 333 (1962)
and sources cited in Danelski, Toward Explanation of Judicial Behavior, 42 U. CiN. L.
REv. 659 (1973).
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investigating the issue under consideration. A necessary first step
in exploring an uncharted domain of social life is the gaining of
an overall sense of the scene in which the interactions one is
interested in take place. If this step is left out and one immediately attempts the invasion of the scene with questionnaires and
elegant statistical analysis, there is a very real danger that the
resultant data will reveal nothing but the author's adeptness at
statistical abstraction. A questionnaire, in order to be both valid
and reliable, must have some relationship to the actual situation
the respondent is a part of, or risk a number of problems. Hence,
questionnaire items relating to judicial attitudes towards women
may in fact be nonsensical if the researcher has no idea of the
context in which the attitude may be portrayed. Another difficulty may arise because of a respondent's reluctance to answer
certain kinds of questions. There have been indications from past
research on judicial decisionmaking that some judges are hesitant
to answer certain kinds of questions, and, indeed, take affront at
the investigation of various facets of their decisionmaking process. This reluctance was experienced in certain instances when
an attempt was made to research judicial sentencing behavior in
cases of selective service violators.3 Such a problem could well be
exacerbated if the items were not related to the types of situations
judges would encounter relevant to the issue. Another area of
difficulty a researcher may encounter, if he skips the first step of
observational research, is wasted time, money, and effort. Only
after the broad framework of judicial behavior has been described
and analyzed can one ascertain those areas relevant and important for future research efforts. All of these reasons for using
participant observation as an exploratory research strategy are
best summarized by David J. Danelski in his article "Toward
Explanation of Judicial Behavior":
The most fruitful way of conducting exploratory research, in my
opinion, is direct observation of judges at work-in court, in chambers, in conference, and so forth. Similar studies have been done of
congressmen, but they are yet to be done for judges. Exploratory
studies based on direct observation will lay foundations for future
research by protraying accurately the contexts of judicial behavior,
by describing the dynamics of decision processes, and by indicating
variables likely to have greatest explanatory power."
a Frankel, Comments of an Independent, Variable Sentence, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 667,
671 n.8 (1973).

0 Danelski, supra note 38, at 659-60.
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With these statements as guides, the following research was
based on approximately 6 months of observation by law students
of judges as they interacted with women attorneys in courtroom
situations. Approximately 17 observations were recorded and
analyzed. 4 These 17 observations were conducted of 15 separate
proceedings. In two cases, two observers were used to record the
interactions of one trial. Most of the courtroom appearances involved both a male and a female attorney, although in one instance two female attorneys were adversaries. By observing proceedings in which both a male and female counselor were present,
observers could compare the treatment of one or the other by the
same judge. Observers were asked to record judicial facial expressions, hand motions, language, and all other items that might
relate to the tone set by judges during a trial or courtroom proceeding where a woman attorney was present.42 They were asked
to be particularly aware of and record any differences in treatment of the male attorney from the female attorney by the judge.
This reference was, however, the only one made to the purpose
of the study. Observers were not told to look for discriminatory
behavior, or behavior reflective of anti-feminine bias on the part
of the bench. Neither were observers exposed to the literature
discussed previously. Instructions were given in a general way,
and observers were told not to draw conclusions or express opinions, but merely state what went on during the time they were in
court.
As indicated, this was an exploratory effort, and, therefore,
no attempt was made to have a random selection of judges.
Whether a particular judge was picked for observation depended
on whether he was to be faced with a female attorney. Nevertheless, different levels of the judiciary were in fact observed, includ" Our goal was to have as many observations as possible, but, as anyone connected
with trial work would be aware, the following factors served to limit the number of observations which could be accomplished: the limited number of women attorneys actively
involved in trial work; the limited number of cases in which a female attorney opposed a
male attorney; routine postponement of trial dates and times; variable schedules of student observers; and the inability to ascertain in advance the names of attorneys presenting
cases at certain court levels.
dl Trial lawyers have for a long time been aware that those items can affect the
outcome of trials. Conner, The TrialJudge, His FacialExpressions, Gestures and General
Demeanor-Their Effect on the Administration of Justice, 1965 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE
251.
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ing appellate courts, trial courts, and juvenile proceedings. Included in the appellate court and trial court categories were observations at both the state and federal levels.
Participant observation can yield a rich and detailed picture
of a social scene. However, when a researcher uses this method,
two cautions must be kept in mind. First, people see and record
different things. Thus, all observations are filtered through the
idiosyncratic eye of the beholder. To control this phenomenon, all
recorded observations were compared for points of similarity. If
a group of observations conducted by different persons contain
similar descriptions of the same kinds of behavior, the researcher
is on safe ground in assuming that the pictures presented are
essentially accurate. Therefore, in this report, the commonalities
present in all 17 observations are described and commented upon.
Second, researchers in analyzing the data from participant observation may perceive different elements and hence draw conclusions at variance with one another. In short, bias can also enter
into the data at the level of analysis. To guard against this, after
the observations were concluded, ten interviews were conducted
with women attorneys in order to have some check on both the
observations and their analysis. The inclusion of the interview
technique in this effort was to check the reliability of the observations and to see whether the perceptions of these attorneys
matched the analysis of the researchers. Both techniques, then,
taken together, formed a powerful methodology for an exploratory
examination of judicial behavior toward women lawyers, and,
hopefully, this combination checked the bias likely to occur if
participant observation was used exclusively.
Since the study was, however, largely participant observation, its major focus is on the area of judicial discrimination and
behavior, not attitudes. Again, this focus is deemed to be a necessary first step in understanding the process of judicial decisionmaking. The relationship between attitudes and behavior is by
no means a simple one, and it is only after behavior is recorded
and analyzed that questionnaires measuring attitudes can be
constructed. Once this initial step is completed, and only then,
can meaningful questions be asked and attitudes interpreted in
the context of ongoing behavior.

III.

THE DATA

St. Francis of Assisi must have had a bit of the trial lawyer
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and the social psychologist in him, as this story quoted from
Leslie L. Conner's article, "The Trial Judge, His Facial Expressions, Gestures and General Demeanor-Their Effect on the
Administration of Justice," indicates:
St. Francis asked a novice one day to accompany him down to the
city where he was going to preach to the people. The two walked
about the streets of the city for several hours in complete silence and
then started back to the monastery. The surprised novice asked him:
"I thought you were going to preach to the people?" St. Francis
answered, "We were preaching all the time while we were walking
by the way we walked, by the way we looked and conducted ourselves, and, without saying a single word, the people got our mes3
sage."

Apparently saints, social psychologists, and trial lawyers are
all well aware that it is not only what a person says, but how he
says it in the silent language of gestures, demeanor, and facial
expressions that determines the real message a person is communicating. Thus, by examining the language, both spoken and unspoken, of trial judges during a courtroom proceeding some insight can be gained concerning the message certain judges get
across about their own role and the perceptions they hold regarding female attorneys. Concerning their own role, judges in this
research seemed to be presenting at least one dominant message.
Judges seemed to present themselves as disinterested observers,
thus conveying to those around them the impression that they
had no vested interest in the outcome of the proceedings. The
following excerpts from the field notes of the observers illustrate
this point.
Notes from an Appeals Court Session-Three judges presiding.
Scene I: Male attorney presenting arguments: Judge A playing
with nose, B and C are writing.
C is looking at papers.
B asks a question, A is still playing with his nose, C looks asleep.
B has his face on his hand.
A is looking away, looking around the room.
C has hand on chin, still looks asleep.
Scene II: Female attorney presenting arguments:
Judge A and C are writing, B is leaning over arm of chair.
C is still writing. A has his fingers on face.
B is looking down, maybe writing.
11Id. at 251-52.
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A is looking away and scratching his ear.
C is still writing.
And from a State Court-one judge presiding-case involves
second degree burglary and conspiracy charges.
Scene I: Witness being questioned by D.A.-male.
Judge: Face leaning against hand, elbow on desk.
Looking at witness and head down writing a little.
Now just looking down. Picks up papers, reading.
Doesn't seem to be listening. Still reading.
Scene II: People's Exhibit A-D.A. points out large diagram.
Judge: Is watching exhibit.
Judge is still watching, witness is pointing things out. Judge is attentive.
Judge is rubbing eye. He picks up more papers.
Reading. Witness is still at exhibit.
Scene III: Cross examination-Public Defender-female. Public
defender is at exhibit asking questions. Judge is watching. Public
defender walks back to podium asking questions at the same time.
Judge is watching the witness, not the public defender. The public
defender dismisses the witness.
Scene IV: Next witness called by D.A.
Judge staring into space while waiting.
He is scratching his neck.
Judge is reading. He puts book back and begins writing. Judge has
his hands on his face; continues writing. Judge glances up when the
witness identifies defendant, then goes back to writing. Judge
glances up and looks at witness's hands. Public defender objects to
description of defendant's cuts by witness. Judge sustains
objection-smiles and goes back to writing.

An analysis of these brief excerpts points to what appears to
be a dominant ritual adopted by most judges observed during this
study. Their actions might best be termed a ritual of noninvolvement. Ritual as used here refers to a set of actions habitually
practiced as a part of a defined role. Judges in our system of
justice are expected to take a rather limited part in the actual
trial proceedings. The model of third-party disinterest is held up
as an ideal role judges are expected to play. This is opposed to
the role model judges are instructed to emulate in civil law countries, where they take a much more activist role in the conducting
of the trial." Thus, in our study it appears that judges do indeed
attempt to play the role of a disinterested third party and thereby
" See Reiss, Lessons in JudicialAdministration from European Countries, 37 J. AM.
JUD. Soc. 102 (1953).
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meet the role expectations appropriate to an American interpretation of the judicial function. This attempt to meet one's role
expectations is engaged in by practicing a ritual. The notion of
ritual fits well with a dramaturgical model of society.15 This sociological model views participants in a social situation as actors.
People are seen as playing out parts or roles in such a way as to
convince both others and themselves that the performance is
credible, i.e., meets the expectations appropriate to the role being
played. Hence, an individual in a role seeks to give a meaning to
that role which is logical, coherent, and credible from both his
own perspective and the perspective of other actors or the audience viewing the performance.
For practicing trial attorneys, the dramaturgical model may
not at first blush appear startling or new. Most trial lawyers are
probably well aware of the theatrical aspects of their court appearances and the procedures publicly engaged in by others,
including judges, during such appearances. However, this model
underscores what many may overlook; namely, that much of the
public ritual is designed to give the appearance of justice and is
not necessarily engaged in to achieve an actual state or outcome
of justice. Appearance rather than fact becomes paramount.
Thus, judges may seek to appear impartial whether they are in
fact so, and their public performances or rituals may disguise
attitudes and opinions that are less than impartial.
The dramaturgical model as applied to'judges can be further
exemplified by noting some of the elements of the scenes described above. Certain striking features stand out: the apparent
effort to avoid eye contact with participants, the hands regularly
near the face to hide or disguise facial expressions, and the tone
of disinterest that judges attempt to set by reading, writing, or
engaging in activity seemingly unrelated to the scene taking
place. All of these things seem designed to convince others that
judges are in fact impartial, disinterested observers."
However, our system of justice has written an extremely dif, For a further discussion of the dramaturgical model, see E.
(1959).

GOFFMAN, THE PRESEN-

TATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE

" Obviously, the courtroom itself is designed to assist this management of impressions. The judge is seated apart from the attorneys and the jury upon a raised dias. He
wears special clothing to set him apart from the other participants, who wear street

clothing.
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ficult script for judicial actors. The part of judge calls for a person
to act as a disinterested third party during proceedings in which
in reality he is interested and has a central role to play. It appears, then, that in order to pull off this rather demanding role,
certain judges adopt an exaggerated ritual which preaches to
those present a message of third party disinterest. The ritual is
exaggerated since judges end up trying to balance the message of
disinterest with one of concern and attention. They periodically
show interest .at what they might consider to be appropriate or
crucial moments of the proceeding. But, once having gone over
to the side of interest and involvement, they must then try to
retip the scales to the side of impartiality and disinterest. Thus,
during less crucial moments, a ritual of noninvolvement is enacted, an exaggerated portrayal to convince others of a credible
performance, a performance that retrieves and maintains the
message of impartiality. Since this is such a difficult role, though,
less than perfect performances can be expected to occur on occasion. When actors catch themselves not following the script, they
will probably try to assume the ritual of noninvolvement in order
to salvage the performance. The following excerpt illustrates this
dynamic:
Notes from a federal court civil proceeding:
Judge smiles very broadly several times in succession as the attorney
talked. However, judge covered face most of the time. Judge will sit
back in chair, sort of moving it back and forth and half smile, then
raise hand to cover the lower half of face so that expression cannot
be seen by anyone.

The judge in this sequence was apparently having a difficult time
staying in character. But again, when this lapse was realized, an
attempt was made to salvage the performance by adopting some
of the mannerisms contained in the portrayal of noninvolvement
given by other judges in the sample.
Not all of the judges observed used this same acting technique to get across a message of impartiality. A second technique
that was observed might be termed a ritual of active interest.
Here, the judge portrays impartiality by involving himself with
the participants in the proceedings, but interacting with all of
them in the same way. A judge might be rude, for example, but
if he is rude or feisty with all participants in the situation the end
result is a message of impartiality as the following sequence
points out:
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Notes from a state appellate court hearing, four justices present:
Scene I: Male attorney for appellant spoke first and Judge I interrupts asking in a rude manner, "Are you aware of our decision on
the constitutionality of other state's statutes?" Male attorney continues argument only to be interrupted by Judge I again who in a
curt tone asks, "They said he shot and killed him during a robbery,
didn't they? How could he shoot him if he wasn't armed?"
Scene II: Male attorney representing the State begins presenting
his answering argument, when Judge I cuts him off abruptly
indicating there is no need to go into the issue he was addressing.
Scene III: Female attorney representing appellant in a different
case begins her argument when Judge I interrupts her in the same
manner as the previous two attorneys were interrupted. "Are you
saying probable cause for extradition is the same as probable cause
for a search warrant?" Female attorney begins to respond only to be
interrupted again by Judge I asking if she were aware of their decisions saying all that was required for extradition was something
approaching probable cause. She answered that she was aware of
those decisions but did not think the case at bar showed anything
approaching probable cause.
When the two prior male attorneys were arguing the other justices sat quietly (one asked one question) and sometimes wrote but
otherwise did nothing. At this point in the woman attorney's argument, two of the justices wrote notes to each other. Otherwise, they
wrote on pads in front of them or sat quietly.

This example shows that impartiality can be portrayed either by adopting a ritual of noninvolvement or a ritual of active
interest. The former method seems to be the one used by three
of the justices. The latter is clearly the style of Justice I, although
again, since all were treated similarly by this actor, the end result
is a message of impartiality.
By using one or the other of these rituals, judges who were
observed as a part of this study generally set a tone of impartiality
during the public proceedings. Therefore, little evidence emerged
that would indicate judges treat female attorneys differently from
their male colleagues during public performances. In fact, in only
one instance was the sex of the attorney alluded to by a judge.
This instance is from a municipal court proceeding in a Denver
suburb. The female defense attorney is explaining to the jurors
the purpose of the voir dire.
Attorney: The purpose of the voir dire is to ask you questions to
obtain a jury as fair and impartial to the city as to the defendant.
Does anyone have a quarrel with this idea? Tell us.
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Judge: I should have asked, Miss X, if they have any quarrel with
a female attorney.
All laughed.
Attorney: It's too late now.
She then proceeded with her questioning of the jury.

It would appear that this episode describes more an attempt at
humor, rather than a clear indication of a negative judicial bias.
Granted, the attempt at humor may have been in poor taste;
nevertheless, the attorney did not appear in this instance to take
offense at the reference to her sex. The experiences recounted by
the women attorneys interviewed corroborated the data reported
by the participant observers. Only one respondent mentioned a
current example of obvious, public judicial bias. This example
involved a judge who would always let her go first in presenting
her case, no matter how many other attorneys were waiting.
To summarize the results of the observational part of the
study, it appeared that judges did not generally show any difference in treatment of female adversaries during courtroom proceedings. In order to further test the validity of this impression,
ten women attorneys were interviewed to see whether they had
experienced differences in treatment by judges, or whether their
impressions matched those gleaned from our observations.
The ten attorneys interviewed ranged in age from 25 to 57
years, with an average age of around 32 years. There was a wide
variation in the time each had practiced, the range being from 9
months to 29 years. All but one was involved in either state or
local government work, the exception being a legal aid attorney.
Three, however, had experience in private practice. All ten were
asked the following question: "Have you found the behavior of
judges toward you any different than their behavior toward male
attorneys?" The responses to this question are noted below. Persons answering are only identified by a number for two reasons.
First, since many answers are similar, biographical data on the
respondent did not seem critical. More importantly, identifying
biographical data is omitted from the responses to protect the
anonymity of the individual answering the question. Thus, the
rather sketchy background data presented above will have to
suffice, although, again, given the similarity of certain of the
answers, the omission does not appear critical.
QUESTION: Have you found the behavior of judges toward you
any different than their behavior toward male attorneys?
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Respondent I: No. Not really. I'm trying to think if I've ever run
into a courtroom problem. I think judges for the most part are much
more gracious and generally very willing to talk with women attorneys and listen to their arguments than most other attorneys, male
attorneys. I've found that the judges once you appear before them
and if you're prepared and know what you're doing, they're just as
willing to listen to you, probably more so. In fact, if anything I think
they probably lean over backwards and sometimes I suppose that
could be patronizing, but I haven't had any real problem with a
judge patronizing me. I've had a lot of problems with other attorneys
patronizing, but not judges.
Respondent II: I never detected it and that may be my own insensitivity. But, I have never in this state or any state I've practiced in
detected what I felt was any difference in treatment by reason of my
being female rather than male. I'm speaking now solely of the bench
of judges.
Respondent III: I think outside of the courtroom there definitely
is. The judges are more friendly with the male attorneys and their
attitudes with the women attorneys are more obviously male-female
type of encounters. They don't know quite how to respond
to-they're not quite willing to accept you as just, I think, a lawyer
or just someone they can come in and chat with in their chambers.
Generally speaking this seems to be true. In the courtroom I would
say again the older judges are more polite than they are with the
men. They go out of their way to make sure that you're not feeling
offended, I think-or left out. I think that's just a superficial thing.
Respondent IV: No difference, and if anything it's an advantage
as opposed to a disadvantage, but I would say I'm treated just like
anybody else who goes up there.' 7 It's terrific.
Respondent V: No. Not really.
Respondent VI: No. There may be a difference but it is not an
offensive difference. It is a difference which comes, I think, from a
theatrical function of the courtroom and the fact that the judge feels
and even I feel that if they're gonna scream at me, they should do
it in a different way than they do it with a male lawyer. In other
words, if they find something that I have done objectionable, they
tend to handle it more softly, somewhat more tactfully than they do
with a male lawyer, but I think that's a jury trial function. I think
they don't-in chambers the reverse is almost true, but I think really
it's the, it's they don't, they want to seem like gentlemen in front of
the jury. And indeed they always are in front of a jury. It is different
but I don't find it offensive. It fits the theatrical moment. I don't
think it would be appropriate for them given the acculturation of the
jury and the lawyers, not to deal with it somewhat more softly. If I
,1 This respondent had just done appeals work.
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keep going after this don't object. I keep trying to rephrase the
question. There tends to be somewhat more exasperation and less
anger, but I think that's a theatrical thing. It never struck me until
you asked the question. That's the way they deal with it. They get
exasperated with me but it's a gentler-they just blow [up] at
males right in front of the jury. They don't to me, but I think it's
because of their own function with the jury. I have discovered, and
I suspect most of the judges know this, that defense counsel-when
I was doing a lot of county court prosecution-whose ordinary trial
tactic is to chew up the prosecutor and scream and yell and holler,
you know, if they did that with me I always won no matter how lousy
the case was because a jury will overreact to that. They wonder why
is that nasty man picking on that nice lady and I think judges are
almost afraid of the same reaction so that they do-if they think I've
done something that they just disapprove of-they tend to squash
me less abruptly, no less firmly but less abruptly and I think really
it may be a function of how they view their role with the jury-that
they had best be gentlemen and if that involves being a little more
tactful, a little more gentle because they are dealing with a female,
then it is, in fact, appropriate. And I'm not sure it isn't because I,
you know, a judge can't turn the jury off either because if he does
who's going to follow his instructions? So, I suspect, although there
is a difference, it is not as much in trial that you see it. It's almost
like you see a different face than you do in chambers.
Respondent VII: Purely on the basis of male-female, no. With one
possible exception. A little bit of paternal attitude I can think of on
one, about one judge, a little bit of this-not anything serious at all.
A little bit of a young, here we have this young girl in here to try a
case.
Respondent VIII: Well, I just haven't noticed adverse behavior. I
think there may be a little more paternalism. It's like they would
come down on and yell at more the average male lawyer.
Respondent IX: Sure, I mean there are differences. Judges don't
like to yell at women. A lot of them can't bring themselves to do
that. It's kind of, I don't feel that there's a prejudice.
Respondent X:

No.

An analysis of the above answers pinpoints a number of interesting items. First, it is apparent that none of the female attorneys interviewed felt that judges during their public performances generally acted in a negative way towards them or as a rule
preached a message that these practitioners were less competent
than their male colleagues. Thus, the perceptions of these respondents did not seem to indicate that judges regularly play out their
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public role in a manner that would indicate they hold different
expectations regarding these practitioners.
Six of the respondents did note that some judges tend to be
more polite or paternalistic. However, the overall tone of the responses was to view this as a positive factor, or at least as a factor
called for by the script for the judicial role. Hence, it appears that
at certain points in a courtroom proceeding, as for example when
a mistake is consistently being made by counsel, certain judges
drop the ritual of noninvolvement and engage in a ritual of chastisement. This ritual is different from the one of active interest.
Clearly, in the chastisement ritual, attorneys are not treated in
the same manner. The one who regularly makes a mistake or
irritates the bench is singled out for a special type of interaction.
It is within the context of this ritual, however, that judges also
appear to discriminate (meaning simply that they treat differently) between male and female attorneys. In fact, it is this difference in treatment that underscores the ritualistic aspects of chastisement. There is a regularity of response on the part of judges
that is triggered by attorney error, but is not shaped simply by
the error. Male attorneys seem to be subject to the full brunt of
judicial wrath. Female attorneys, on the other hand, are less
likely to be the receivers of the full chastisement ritual, but are
instead treated in a more "gentlemanly" manner.
Again, the dramaturgical model can perhaps offer some insight into this phenomenon. As one attorney stated (Respondent
VI), this differential treatment may in fact be just an extension
of the theatrical role of judge. She noted that by treating the
female attorney less harshly, the judge does maintain a role
whereby he avoids influencing the jury. If she is correct in her
observations, the judicial attempt at maintaining impartiality is
a more complex phenomenon than first appeared. Judges, in
order to show others that they are impartial, in order to convince
others that their performance is a credible one, have to play out
their part in accordance with the expectations the audience has
regarding what is a legitimate performance. Thus, the game has
to be played according to how these others define what is impartial. In our culture it has not been a generally acceptable sign of
impartiality to "yell" at women or to engage in the ritual of
chastisement with women in precisely the same way as one engages in it with men. Therefore, it seems that some judges do
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treat women differently in the chasetisement ritual, in order to
give the appearance of impartiality.
The perceptions of the respondents corresponded to the data
reported by the participant observers in that neither group perceived judges as acting in a more negative way toward female as
opposed to male attorneys. Differences that were noted in the
area of politeness appeared to be situationally anchored, so that
judges did use a different chastisement ritual when lawyers made
mistakes in their own performances. While some respondents
mentioned paternalistic behavior on the part of certain judicial
functionaries, this did not appear to be a predominant problem,
and in some instances it was interpreted as merely being an extension of the theatrical role judges play for the sake of credibility
with the jury. A review of these data also seems to indicate that
in some instances paternalism is a function of the age of the judge
and also the age of the advocate, and is therefore not related in
all cases simply to the sex of the attorney.
A second interesting point that emerges from these interviews is the concern shown about the negative paternalism of
other attorneys. This concern about other attorneys is more
clearly elucidated in the following comments.
I don't think it's the judges. I think it's attorneys mostly at a
trial (Respondent X).
I've had a lot of problems with other attorneys patronizing, but
not judges (Respondent I).
When I moved to Denver, for the first time I encountered what
I had read about and never believed. That there was I felt a discrimination. It wasn't uniform but it was certainly far more widespread.
But it was at the level of fellow lawyers, not the bench, not the
judges (Respondent II).

It seems, then, that some respondents are more concerned with
paternalism among fellow practitioners, and that further this paternalism is perceived in a more negative way than that noted
about judges.
Thirdly, some concern was also expressed about the role
judges play when they are offstage (i.e., in chambers). As noted
previously, the dramaturgical model focuses attention on the fact
that public performances may not be indicative of what is actually occurring or of the true state of participants in a social
scene. Thus, judges who portray a nonbiased, impartial attitude
toward female practitioners, if they are simply play acting, will
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present a different face away from the audience. Relating to
judges offstage, these comments taken from the interviews previously quoted are instructive.
It's almost like you see a different face than you do in chambers
(comment by Respondent VI on the politeness of judges in court).
They're not quite willing to accept you as just, I think, a lawyer or
just someone they can come in and chat with in their chambers
(Respondent III).

These comments suggest that women practitioners face a
more difficult task in being accepted in the informal settings of
the legal profession than the task they confront in being accepted
and treated as professionals in the formal setting of the court.
Informally, there may well be an atmosphere of male camaraderie
that is threatened by female intrusion. Thus, either resentment
or negative paternalism is experienced by women in these backstage interactions. The data suggest, then, that a crucial area of
examination is the acceptance of women in the "clubhouse" even
after admission has been gained and status recognized in the
arena of play. This acceptance is crucial because many pretrial
conferences, which can be viewed as backstage rehearsals, make
public presentations a foregone conclusion. Furthermore, other
elements of legal work, such as negotiations with other attorneys
or with judges, take place behind the scenes, in the offices and
chambers hidden from public view. Failure to be recognized as an
equal in these settings can have the same adverse consequences
for the individual attorney and the course of justice as the same
failure in a public setting. This fact is well demonstrated in the
following observation by one of the respondents.
Just straight drunk driving, petty theft. I'm the only D.A. I know
whom the judge tried to browbeat into disposing of the cases that
were on his docket and that's a judge whom I-I think if I had been
a male he would have tried but we would not have gotten to the
point where I had to say to him, all right, you can take the plea if
you want to, but you do it over the objection of the district attorney
and he finished it. I think there's a tendency in judges who by and
large are nice middle class, aggressive males, to try to push females
more in settlement. I found this true on the civil side with civil cases
that I handled because I used to handle civil cases for the firm I was
with right up to trial. I felt-maybe I felt more pushed but I also
thought that when . . .my [male] partner came in, boy, did they
then back down, you know, and they-judges like to keep their
docket clean, somehow they think that's part of their judicial function. I don't think it is (Respondent VI).
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This comment not only hints at the importance of being
accepted as an equal offstage and the apparent difficulty some
women may encounter in this regard, but it also points at another
element contained in the administration of justice and the judicial system. This system in part shares the characteristics of any
bureaucracy in our society. Most notable is the tendency for bureaucracies to rationally coordinate their activities in order to
maximize efficient production. The courts, too, are involved in a
quest for efficient production, though in this instance the product
is the number of cases which are disposed of. Some judges, then,
try to clear their docket, and an efficient way of doing this is to
attempt to avoid the cost, both in terms of time and money, of a
trial. Negotiations, therefore, and acceptance in the negotiating
milieu are crucial.
Finally, because the court is in part a bureaucracy, it also has
within it actors who play the role of bureaucrats-that is, managers of schedules, files and so forth. Just as acceptance, then, is
important in the actual settings of negotiation, so too, acceptance
and recognition by the bureaucratic functionaries of the judicial
system are also important. Four of the respondents in our study
indicated that the role of the bureaucrat, and the acceptance
these functionaries exhibit toward women attorneys, may also
constitute a problem area for further investigation.
I notice particularly when I go into a clerk's office in court, they
immediately assume I'm there to look at a file or get some forms or
file something. . . . Most of the clerks in the court, clerk's offices
are women and they, I don't think they want to accept the fact that
there are women attorneys (Respondent III).
Sometimes the clerks in the courts are just very snotty and I think
it's because I'm a woman, especially if they're women clerks, you
know, they just snap at you or just kind of treat you-they don't give
you any respect that, say, they give to the male attorneys (Respondent V).
Sure you run into your problems, but they are not with judges, but
more with the people in his office (Respondent IX).

These responses suggest that clerks can present problems to female attorneys, and often more problems than judges present in
terms of role recognition. Respondent I further describes these
problems, the serious effects they can have, and one strategy that
seems to have worked for her in overcoming them.
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The real difference has been the clerks. And now all the clerks who
were sort of abrupt are just as sweet and gracious as they can possibly be. And I think one of the important things to remember is that
in dealing with the court system, the clerks can do a lot for you.
There are many women clerks who are older who work for judges and
they can control the access to the judge's calendar and if they're
rude to you or treat you very abruptly, it's difficult to do anything.
And all those clerks who used to be so rude and snippy are now very
nice, if you come in with some official title. It's funny.

IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

One of the key areas this research sought to explore was the
interaction between judges and women attorneys during the
course of trial. By examining a small select group of judicial
functionaries, in an exploratory fashion, it was hoped that some
of their behaviors could be categorized, so that future research
efforts could pinpoint whether the behaviors noted were related
to expectations judges held concerning the role of attorney and
who should play that role. The results of this exploratory research
seem to indicate that judges do in fact regularly engage in certain
kinds of behavior. However, the behaviors categorized did not
generally relate to the sex of the attorney. Thus, judges did not
generally seem to indicate by their public behavior that female
practitioners were considered in a secondary role to their male
counterparts.
In the dramaturgical view of society, judges adopted strategies that would portray to their audience (juries and observers)
that their performances were credible and in keeping with the
script society had provided them. The data collected seem to
pinpoint certain rituals used by judges when they are on stage.
One ritual that stood out was the ritual of noninvolvement, used
to portray a stance of third party disinterest or impartiality. Certain judicial role players, however, portrayed impartiality by a
ritual involvement in the proceedings called a ritual of active
interest. It appeared ritualistic becase neither the individual confronting the judge, his or her utterances, nor the subject at hand
changed the judge's interaction patterns.
Finally, ritual chastisement seems to be another strategy utilized by judges. Here, a difference in treatment is perceived between male and female lawyers. But this difference, too, seems
aimed at impressing the jury or audience with the judge's third
party impartiality. It is expected by all participants that women
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will not be "yelled at" nor chastised in the same way as men. If,
in fact, both were chastised in the same manner the viewers
might well interpret this as judicial bias against women.
As noted in the beginning of this paper, the role of the woman
attorney is in a state of flux. She may be moving from a situation
where public nonacceptance was the rule, to a situation where it
is now an exception. At least these data suggest this is the case.
Judges may presently be more conscious of their public presentations regarding the area of attorneys' sexual identity. Therefore,
to convince others of the credibility of their performance they
seldom present themselves as anything but unbiased observers
when playing the role of trial judge.
V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The notion of ritual as discussed above can be particularly
fruitful in further attempts at examining judicial role players. As
Irving Crespi notes in his article on attitudes and their utility in
predicting behavior, measures must be based on situations in
which the attitude is likely to be portrayed." Attitudes are described by him as a combination of belief, performance, and intention, and to measure this variable one must construct questionnaire items based on the typical reality in which the respondent is involved. Therefore, a measure of judicial attitudes toward women attorneys should include items on how judges might
vary their typical ritual behavior in response to the sexual identity of counsel. This and other areas of future research are discussed below.
This research suggests a number of other areas for future
research efforts. There was a clear indication in our data that
women may experience a more difficult time in penetrating and
being accepted into the informal structure of the legal profession
than they experience currently in the formal arena of play. While
the data suggests that judges do not publicly indicate they have
different expectations concerning male or female practitioners,
the expectations that seemed dominant in even some of the recent literature may be expressed more openly in behind-thescenes interactions of the legal profession. Thus, studies are
needed of attorneys and judges offstage, in the informal, less
11Crespi, What Kinds of Attitude Measures Are Predictiveof Behavior, 35 PUB. OPIN.
Q. 327, 333 (1971).
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public areas of interaction. Such studies could still be based on
a participant observation methodology. Although there may be
difficulty in researchers penetrating this inner sanctum, such
penetration is by no means impossible. It has been done with
juvenile gangs,49 problem families,5 0 police officers,5 and, as indicated previously, with congressmen." Caution should be exercised, however, in making sure trained observers are utilized, a
problem to be discussed more thoroughly below. Only after a firm
groundwork of this type of exploratory research has been laid, can
we proceed to the more empirical kinds of studies dealing with
attitudes and their relationship to the process of decision making
within the legal realm.
The data also point to the need for studies of bureaucratic
functionaries within the legal system, i.e., court clerks, and their
relationship with women attorneys. As noted, studies involving
the informal structure and the bureaucratic nature of the profession are important, because, just as failure to be recognized as a
professional in the formal arena can adversely affect career
aspirations, so too, failure to be recognized as a colleague in the
clubhouse or the office can spell difficulty and doom. The observation of one respondent reiterates this point:
I think one of the important things to remember is that in dealing
with the court system, the clerk can do a lot for you ... if they're
rude to you or treat you very abruptly, it's difficult to do anything.

Much more work needs to be done observing judges during
the course of trial. Such observations can lead to a fuller understanding of the ritualistic behavior of all participants and the
meaning of these rituals for the course of justice. However, observations can be a tricky undertaking and the need for trained,
sensitive observers cannot be overemphasized. This study used
law students as observers, and, generally, it was found that they
did an excellent job. In some instances, though, the observers
became over-interested in the legal issues, and, thus, behavioral
issues may have been missed. It is not clear that the answer to
"' See most notably

THRASHER, THE GANG

(1963).

30Here, the most recent well publicized example is the Public Broadcasting Service
telecast of the Loud family, "An American Family."
"' J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966) and, more recently, J. GILSINAN, THE
MAKING OF A POLICEMAN: SOCIAL WORLD CONSTRUCTIONS IN A POLICE ACADEMY (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation in the University of Colorado Library).
" See note 41 supra.
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this problem is to be found in the use of social science students.
They may not be up to the task required, since they may much
more likely be overwhelmed by the mystery of legal jargon and
proceedings. It would appear that people with a background in
both the social sciences and the legal profession would be ideal
candidates for such observations.
Another quality observers need to possess is sensitivity. People who are attuned to the subtleties of social interactions and the
meanings such interactions can reveal should be considered a key
to success. This study relied primarily on women observers,"3 and
as the excerpt below indicates, this strategy may be the best when
the issue being considered is similar.
Interviewer: By and large, you would say that anyone in the courtroom observing the courtroom appearances would not really be able
to detect that much difference and would not be able to detect
anything unfavorable?
Respondent:

I think the women might. I don't think men could.

Interviewer:

It's just very subtle?
Respondent: It's a very subtle thing. I have talked to other women
who regularly try cases. None of us I think articulate it very well.
You can feel it, but it's very difficult to articulate it. I suspect that
some of the same patronizing tones, some of the same sloppiness of
behavior occurs with any minority group in the courtroom, because
I've seen the same thing, the same tones used with black lawyers as
a trial lawyer. The same there-there dear, everything is going to be
all right. Only that's the way I translate it. I don't know how they
translate it, but I've seen it.

It should be noted that this respondent is the same one who
interpreted the paternalism of judges as merely an extension of
their theatrical role. Nevertheless, this portion of the interview
underscores two very important factors. First, that sensitive observers are needed to conduct this type of research. Second, the
ideas expressed in the above statement point to a justification for
this and other research efforts in the field of legal-judicial practice. The purpose of this research and future research in the area
should be to translate and articulate the dynamics of the interac33 A problem with using women observers for this type of project might be an oversensitivity or reverse bias on their part. One would expect, therefore, that, if errors were made
in observations, such errors would be slanted towards a negative view of judicial behavior.
The fact that our observational data did not contain extremely negative descriptions
strengthens the findings.
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tions that occur between and among participants in the system,
whether they be attorneys, judges, defendants, or bureaucrats. It
is only with an understanding of these issues that the system can
be improved so that all the actors can play their parts in a drama
that ends with justice.

